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Abstract 
 
One impediment to increasing the fuel economy standards for light-duty vehicles is the long-
standing argument that reducing vehicle mass to improve fuel economy will inherently make 
vehicles less safe.  This technical paper summarizes and examines the research that is cited in 
support of this argument, and presents more recent research that challenges it.  We conclude that 
the research claiming that lighter vehicles are inherently less safe than heavier vehicles is flawed, 
and that other aspects of vehicle design are more important to the on-road safety record of 
vehicles.  This paper was prepared for a workshop on experts in vehicle safety and fuel economy, 
organized by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, to discuss technologies and designs that 
can be taken to simultaneously improve vehicle safety and fuel economy; the workshop was held 
in Washington DC on October 3, 2006. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
This technical paper is on the safety impacts of improving the fuel economy of new light-duty 
vehicles which have been redesigned to meet greenhouse gas reduction and oil savings goals. We 
do not consider changes in driving practices such as changed speed limits; the reductions are 
achieved by changing the physical characteristics of the vehicles and the vehicle fleet.  (We 
define fuel economy as miles per gallon using the present laboratory tests.)  Our analysis is based 
on both the traffic risks of past vehicles and those inferred for the new designs. For the new 
designs, substantial investments in the manufacturing process and a substantial period of time 
would be involved. But, the long term increase in manufacturing cost per vehicle could be small 
to moderate.    
 
Vehicle mass is a major factor in fuel economy.  In the late 1970s-early 1980s, the most 
important change in vehicle design was the virtual elimination of the heaviest cars from the new 
vehicle fleet. Figure 1 shows that the fraction of new vehicles that were over 4000 lbs decreased 
from 46% of sales in 1975 (40% cars, 6% light trucks) to 9% in 1980 (3% cars, 6% light trucks).   
 
Figure 1.  Distribution of new light-duty vehicle sales, by year, type, and EPA weight (curb 
weight plus 300 lbs; source: Heavenrich 2005)   
 
These heavier vehicles remained a small part of the new vehicle fleet until the late 1980’s, when 
the sales of heavier light trucks, many used as substitutes for cars, began to increase.  By 2003 
the fraction of light trucks over 4000 lbs (32%) was approaching the level of heavy car sales in 
1975 (40%).   
 
If the mass of a typical modern car were reduced 10%, the fuel economy would be increased 3% 
to 8% (An et al., 2002).  The low benefit would roughly characterize mass reduction without a 
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compensating reduction in engine displacement.  The high benefit would characterize a vehicle 
with the same “performance”, i.e. with a smaller engine to match the reduced weight (albeit with 
higher engine speeds to maintain the same drivability). 
 
There are several ways to reduce a vehicle’s mass: a) Design optimal components and local 
structures to reduce mass.  For a given vehicle class/size (e.g. midsize car), as surveyed in the 
early 1990s, there was a large variation in the masses of production vehicles (DeCicco and Ross, 
1993).  Much of that opportunity still remains.  b) Change the basic vehicle structure of 
conventional body-on-frame SUVs and pickups, by using a car-based unibody design, as in the 
so-called crossover SUVs (presented and discussed in connection with figures 13 and 14 below), 
and in the Honda Ridgeline pickup truck.  c) Adopt lighter propulsion components, especially 
small engines capable of switching to high power by operating at high-speed or with turbocharge 
(Shahed, 2006).  In addition, simpler and lighter transmissions can be used, like automatic 
“manual” or double clutch.  d) Continue to increase the content of light materials, such as high-
strength steels supported by advanced steel forming (DeCicco, 2005), light metals (aluminum 
and magnesium), and fiber-reinforced plastics (Lovins et al., 2005).  Finally, smaller vehicles can 
be built. Because typical designs are not optimal, relatively safe small vehicles can be built 
primarily for use on urban roads.   
 
Mass has just one intrinsic property critical to safety that is independent of design and materials: 
in a collision with another vehicle or a roadside object, the lighter of the pair is more strongly 
decelerated. Depending on the details of the crash, the stronger deceleration may create a greater 
risk to an occupant of a light vehicle. But this additional risk is relatively small compared to what 
frequently happens in a serious crash: a) intrusion of another vehicle or roadside object into the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle in question, b) rollover of the vehicle, or c) failure of the 
restraints to keep the occupants away from contact with hard interior surfaces.  
 
The key issue to prevent intrusion is the strength of the passenger compartment and the height 
and stiffness of the collision partner.  It is practical to use stronger materials and more 
compatible designs to reduce casualties in two-vehicle collisions; some crossover SUVs are 
designed with this in mind.  Mass is not intrinsic to any of this; for example, light honeycomb or 
fiber-reinforced materials sever the historical connection between mass and strength.  
 
The key issue to prevent rollover is to lower a vehicle’s center of gravity.  Although SUVs and 
pickups are more likely to roll over than passenger cars, the height of a vehicle’s center of 
gravity, and not mass, determine the propensity of a vehicle to roll over.  The propensity to 
rollover can be reduced by lowering the center of gravity and/or by increasing the trackwidth. 
Electronic stability control (ESC) is a new technology that provides automatic braking to inhibit 
rollovers from occurring.  Once a rollover occurs, the crush resistance and performance of the 
roof will affect whether a belted occupant will be injured, and whether the occupants are belted 
will affect whether they are ejected (ejection is likely to result in serious to fatal injury).   
 
Restraints (both safety belts and air bags) and interior padding provide important protection to 
occupants in all types of crashes.  Side curtain air bags, which reduce head contacts with 
windows, are becoming more prevalent, and an increasing number of these systems can be 
triggered in a rollover.  Advanced seat belts, with pretensioners and load limiters, are being 
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incorporated in many models.  Under research are four-point seatbelts, which would hold 
occupants in position in side-impact crashes better than today’s three-point lap/shoulder belts.  
Improved restraints would also better control the deceleration in crashes with roadside objects, 
and thus further minimize the historical relationship between vehicle mass and safety. 
 
Although vehicle mass is not intrinsic to improving occupant safety, currently safety 
technologies, such as ESC, curtain side airbags, and advanced seat belts, tend to be included in 
heavier, and more expensive, car models. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that there is little, if any, trade-off between 
improvements in fuel economy and in safety in light motor vehicles, particularly if priority is 
given to both of these goals.  A reduction in vehicle mass is an important technique for 
improving fuel economy, but certainly not the only or even the most effective one.  While lighter 
vehicles are at a disadvantage in crashes with heavier ones, this does not suggest that a general 
reduction in vehicle weight across all vehicle types would have a significant impact on safety nor 
even on vehicle size.  This is not only because the physics of the situation concerns only the 
relative masses of colliding vehicles, but because a substantial majority of casualties in motor 
vehicle crashes are unrelated to the masses of the vehicles involved.     
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II. Crashes 
 
A. Conditions that lead to crashes 
 
Crashes that result in serious injuries and deaths are associated with dangerous vehicles, 
hazardous roads, and driving errors.  Driver mistakes have many causes, including drowsiness, 
inexperience, aggressiveness, alcohol, and distractions. "Microsleep" events at the wheel may be 
the cause of 25% of serious crashes (Horne and Raynor, 1995; NHTSA, 2006, chapter 7).   
Teenage male drivers are involved in roughly 4 times more fatal crashes per mile than over-25 
year olds. (Massie et al., 1995; Kahane, 1997, page 6)   Use of cellular telephones has been 
strongly implicated with increased crash rates (McEvoy et al., 2005; McCartt et al., 2005). 
 
Rural roads (other than interstates) are often poorly designed. They are often narrow; shoulders 
may be poor or missing; the roads are unlighted and poorly signed. On some roads, traffic greatly 
exceeds design speeds and carrying capacity, as rural areas have become increasingly suburban. 
Also, budgets for enforcement are often too limited, and EMS is remote. Half of traffic fatalities 
in the US occur in counties with less than 70 households per square mile. Less than 30% of the 
US population lives in these counties, but they cover 90% of the land area.  The cost of 
improving many of those roads would be high. Of course, drivers share the responsibility for 
those deaths. Many roads simply require special driver care to be negotiated safely.  We believe 
that, if economically justified, roads should be improved so that an unusual level of driver 
attention is not required. However, unsafe driving and unsafe roads cannot be eliminated.  
 
As with roads, a driver needs to be aware of his vehicle. He or she is responsible; if she is tired, 
she should find a chance to rest; if inexperienced, he should drive less aggressively; and if the 
vehicle has limitations like less than excellent handling and brakes, the driver should drive more 
defensively. Many analysts believe that essentially all responsibility for crashes rests with 
drivers.  They let the vehicle manufacturers off the hook. We believe that if there are safety 
technologies and vehicle designs that would reduce risk at an acceptable cost it is the 
responsibility of regulators and manufacturers to see them incorporated in new vehicles.   
 
B.  Types of crashes 
 
Vehicle crashes and casualties come in many categories and their analysis is complicated. 
However, one can simplify by focusing on the most important categories. The simplified picture 
is still very rich, and not misleading about the whole.  First, as shown in Table 1, 82% of all 
vehicles involved in fatal crashes are light-duty vehicles, and account for 85% of fatalities.  
Motorcycles account for another 8% of vehicles in fatal crashes, and 12% of fatalities. 
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Table 1. Distribution of 2004 fatal crashes and fatalities (source: FARS) 
Vehicles Occupant deaths 
Vehicle type Number Percent Number Percent 
Cars 25,512 44% 19,092 51% 
SUVs 7,781 13% 4,735 13% 
Vans (including minivans) 3,671 6% 2,036 5% 
Pickups 10,773 18% 5,801 16% 
Other light trucks 127 0% 35 0% 
Subtotal, light-duty vehicles 47,864 82% 31,699 85% 
Buses and medium-/heavy-duty trucks 5,195 9% 832 2% 
Motorcycles 4,446 8% 4,344 12% 
Other 211 0% 143 0% 
Unknown 698 1% 124 0% 
Total 58,414 100% 37,142 100% 
 
As indicated in Table 2, only 40% of fatal crashes are multi-vehicle events, accounting for only 
42% of fatalities; these crashes are almost always within the driving lanes.  46% of fatal crashes, 
and 45% of fatalities, are single-vehicle events, with the vehicle either crashing into an object 
such as a tree or pole, or rolling over; 26% of all traffic fatalities (and 30% of all vehicle 
occupant fatalities) in 2004 came from vehicle rollovers, either as a first or subsequent event.  In 
95% of single-vehicle crashes, the crash occurs outside the driving lanes (FARS).  Most of the 
remaining 13% of crashes and fatalities involve crashes with pedestrians or bicyclists.  
 
Table 2. Distribution of 2004 fatal crashes and fatalities, all motorized vehicles (source: FARS)  
Crashes Fatalities Occupant Fatalities 
Crash type Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Two- (or multi-) vehicle 
crashes 15,451 40% 17,937 42% 17,937 48% 
One-vehicle crashes into 
object such as tree 13,177 34% 14,068 33% 14,068 38% 
Non-collisions 4,554 12% 4,964 12% 4,964 13% 
First event rollovers   3,828 9% 3,828 10% 
Vehicle crashes with 
pedestrians or bicyclists 5,028 13% 5,604 13% 28 0% 
Other 43 0% 39 0% 39 0% 
Total 38,253 100% 42,612 100% 37,036 100% 
Note: 72% of vehicles in non-collisions are classified as first-event rollovers in FARS, while 35% of vehicles in 
one-vehicle crashes are considered subsequent-event rollovers; the incidence of rollovers in other types of crashes is 
negligible.  19% of vehicles, 26% of all fatalities, and 30% of all occupant fatalities are associated with a first or 
subsequent rollover, regardless of the crash type.  FARS is NHTSA’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System, a census 
of all traffic fatalities on public roadways in the U.S. 
 
Fatal crashes between cars and light-duty trucks, and between two light-duty trucks, have been 
increasing, while crashes between two cars have been decreasing (Figure 2).  These trends are 
due to a combination of the increased popularity of light trucks, including minivans, SUVs, and 
pickups, as well as a reduction in car-car crash fatalities due to improvements in car designs and 
increased use of (improved) seat belts and airbags. The result is an increase in the fraction of  
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Figure 2. Percent of driver fatalities in crashes between two light-duty vehicles, by crash partner 
(Source: FARS) 
 
fatalities in crashes between cars and light trucks, from 26% to 54% (Figure 2), as well as an 
increase in the fraction of driver fatalities in angle crashes, from 36% to 49% (Figure 3).  In 
particular, fatalities in “angle” crashes in which one vehicle strikes the other in the side have 
been increasing rapidly, from 10% in 1975 to 28% in 2004 (Figure 4; the angle crashes shown 
include both trucks striking cars in the side and vice versa). 
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Figure 3. Percent of driver fatalities in crashes between two light-duty vehicles, by crash 
orientation (Source: FARS)  
 
Figure 5 shows how vehicle design has affected the fatality rate in new vehicles over time.  The 
fatality rate is the number of fatalities divided by the number of vehicles sold, and is calculated 
for certain types of crashes in Figure 5 by vehicle type.  Fatality rates are more instructive than 
the number of fatalities because of the dramatic increase in the number of light trucks, 
particularly SUVs, in use.  Although one-quarter of all traffic fatalties in 2004 came from vehicle 
rollovers, and the total number has not changed much in twenty years, Figure 5 shows that the 
fatality rate in new SUVs has been cut in half over the last six years (from 46 to 19 fatalities per 
million vehicles).  This decline can be attributed to manufacturers reducing the center of gravity 
and increasing the track width in newer SUV models, particularly the car-based “crossover” 
SUVs, making them more stable and less likely to rollover.  The rollover fatality rate in new cars 
has shown a consistent and steady decrease between 1977 and 2005 (from 35 to 19 fatalities per 
million vehicles).   
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Figure 4. Percent of driver fatalities in crashes between a car and a light truck, by crash 
orientation (Source: FARS)  
 
Figure 5. Driver fatality rates in rollover crashes for 1- to 3-year old vehicles, by year and 
vehicle type 
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Deaths in rollovers and in other single-vehicle crashes should continue to decrease in the near 
future as a result of on-board “active safety” equipment in many new vehicles.  The main 
innovation is stability controls, in which brakes are applied automatically and independently at 
the four wheels in a way that inhibits uncontrolled vehicle skidding and rollover.  In addition, 
rollover fatalities can be further reduced by strengthening vehicle roofs and pillars. 
 
In this paper we focus on vehicle occupants, neglecting pedestrian and bicyclist deaths. Thus, we 
focus on the first three rows of Table 2, the 87% of traffic deaths that involve occupants in two-
vehicle (mostly front-to-front and front-to-side) crashes, single-vehicle crashes into objects, and 
non-collision (mostly rollover) crashes.  
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III. Injury Science  
 
A. Energy and momentum 
 
Traditionally, a motor-vehicle crash is described as a sequence of three “collisions”.  In the first, 
the vehicle strikes another vehicle or, an object, or rolls over, or a combination of these.  The 
vehicle’s exterior is partially crushed. As some of the energy of motion is transformed into crush 
energy, the remaining relative motion may be shared among the interacting bodies, which can be 
good because it may reduce speeds. Depending on the crash severity, the location and direction 
of crash force, and the stiffness of the vehicle and of the colliding object, the crush can intrude 
into the vehicle’s passenger compartment, which is potentially very dangerous. 
 
In the second “collision”, occupants strike interior surfaces of the vehicle and restraints. 
Restraints, seat belts, air bags, and perhaps padding, have reduced injuries from this type of 
collision.  In future vehicles, occupants would primarily interact with restraints, or with 
intrusions, if the crash is of high-severity or unfavorable geometry. 
 
The third ”collision”, involves crashes among parts of each occupant’s body, such as organs and 
skeleton. If the contact between an occupant and a hard surface is brief enough, the interaction 
among parts of the body will be small and the occupant may avoid injury.  
 
A vehicle which tends to absorb a lot of the crash energy, crushing structures in the space 
between its exterior and the passenger compartment, can protect occupants from forceful contact.  
This is particularly promising in front; however, there is little space in which to absorb energy 
and protect the near occupant in a crash at the side.  According to the momentum principle, low-
mass vehicles may rebound strongly from crashes.  Vehicles with low mass have been criticized 
for putting their occupants at risk in this connection.  But is such a recoil-related injury probable?  
We will discuss the issue in Section VI. 
 
B. Crash tests 
 
Historically vehicles have not been instrumented to record crash information (although some 
vehicles now come with event data recorders).  Although there are hundreds of pieces of 
information that are systematically collected about each fatal crash in the US, and reported in 
FARS, the most critical physical parameters, like vehicle speeds, timing, and forces, are not 
known. (The velocities may be known if the vehicle had an event data recorder, but that 
information is not part of the public database. Moreover, “delta-V”, a second velocity-related 
characteristic based on the crush energy of a vehicle in a crash, is only determined in a small 
sample of cases using expert measurements and computation.) Thus, rather than depending on 
actual on-road experience, the crashworthiness of vehicles tends to be evaluated using 
standardized laboratory crash tests. The primary tools are a frontal test and a side test, in which 
each vehicle is instrumented and carries an instrumented dummy, and a rollover test.  In the 
frontal and side tests, the vehicle is crashed in a prescribed manner against a “barrier”.  The 
barrier may artificially represent another vehicle, or it may be a pole which is a frequent one-
vehicle crash hazard. These tests are highly valuable to vehicle designers.   
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It is useful to distinguish between the two general characteristics of vehicles that protect their 
occupants from death or serious injury in a crash: crash avoidance and crashworthiness.  Crash 
avoidance is the ability of a vehicle, through driver-controlled and automatic handling and 
braking, to avoid a serious crash altogether.  Although braking distances of vehicles are regulated 
and tested, other means of crash avoidance are not.  Consumers Union conducts handling and 
braking tests on vehicles.  Crashworthiness refers to the ability of a vehicle to protect its 
occupants once a crash has occurred.  Under the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP), the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) conducts crash tests in a laboratory 
setting to ensure that new vehicles comply with crashworthiness standards.  A 5-star ranking 
based on the results of NCAP testing is assigned to each vehicle model, and made publicly 
available on the NHTSA website.  Currently NHTSA conducts tests of frontal, side impact, and 
rollover crashes for the NCAP program.  The Insurance Institute of Highway Safety (IIHS) 
conducts these and other tests, and publicizes their results on their website.  Vehicle 
manufacturers have striven to improve the designs of their vehicles to ensure that they do not 
receive a low NCAP score.  When they were first introduced in 1979, no vehicles received 5 
stars on the frontal test, and many earned only 1 or 2 stars.  Virtually all of the newest model 
year cars now earn 4 or 5 stars, at least on the frontal impact test (GAO, 2005).  For example, the 
Elantra recently improved from 3 to 5 stars, an improvement supported by a 30% reduction in 
on-road risk.  The Focus similarly improved from the model it replaced, the Escort.   
 
This history strongly suggests that regularly conducted standardized tests are needed for the 
compatibility of cars being struck on the side by popular body-on-frame light trucks. 
Standardized tests have proven to be powerful motivators of safety redesigns and innovation.  
 
There is another issue: As important as crash tests have been, they do not adequately measure 
vehicle safety for purposes of consumer information (although it is often implied that they do).  
The risks in actual driving only weakly correlate with crash test results (Newstead et al., 2002). 
The weakness of the correlation is not adequately explained by the uncertainty associated with 
driver behavior.  A major reason is that the crash speed of the side impact test is not high enough 
to yield less than top ranking for most vehicles (Arbelaez et al., 2005). And the test barrier is too 
low to mimic car crashes with the high bumpers and fronts of many light trucks. Yet there are 
more than enough such crash deaths on the road to justify a change in the test.   
 
As useful as crash tests have been, they have not been effective in settling our issue, mass and 
safety. 
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IV. Analyses of on-road fatality rates 
 
A. The Evans analyses 
 
Perhaps the earliest statistical analysis of on-road vehicle crashworthiness was conducted by 
Leonard Evans (Evans, 2004a; Evans, 2004b).  Evans studied the ratio of fatality rates of the 
drivers of two cars in head-on collisions.  Evans took the ratio of the number of driver fatalities 
in the lighter car to the number of driver fatalities in the heavier car, and plotted those ratios 
against the ratio of the weights of the two cars.  Evans found that the fatality ratio between 
drivers of two cars increased strongly as the mass ratio between the cars increased; for example, 
in Figure 6, if the mass of two cars differs by a factor of two, the fatality risk to the driver in the 
lighter car is 12 times (23.56 = 12) that of the driver in the heavier car. 
 
Figure 6. Driver fatality ratio vs. mass ratio for frontal crashes of two cars between 1980 and 
2004.  Recreated by LBNL using FARS data. 
 
Evans’ striking graph based on fatality ratios was extremely influential in supporting the 
argument that mass, or more precisely, the mass ratio between vehicles, is the primary vehicle 
attribute that protects occupants, and that reductions in mass will inherently lead to increases in 
fatalities.  He supported this interpretation arguing that the principle of momentum explains why 
heavy cars protect their occupants better than light cars.  However, if correct, Evans’ results 
suggest that fatalities will increase only if the disparity in mass between vehicles increases; if all 
vehicles are made lighter, or the mass disparity reduced, his results suggest that fatalities will 
decrease.   
 
Although Evans’ plot looks impressive, there are critical flaws. First, Evans analysis, by its 
definition, doesn’t distinguish aggressiveness, vehicle designs that tend to kill people in other 
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vehicles in frontal collisions, from protectiveness, vehicles that protect their own occupants.  
Using Evans’ ratio, a car design that tends to kill others appears as a safety attribute! Second, one 
may not be learning about implications of mass, but about design characteristics that have 
correlated with mass in past designs; and they may correlate less strongly in designs of the 
future. Finally, the contribution of frontal crashes between two cars to the total number of driver 
fatalities in crashes between two light-duty vehicles has declined substantially, from 36% of all 
driver fatalities in 1980 to 14% in 2004 (Figure 7).  As discussed above, this decline is a result 
of: (1) improved crashworthiness of cars, due in part to frontal crash testing and improved seat 
belt design and use, and inclusion of airbags; and (2) increasing numbers of pickups, SUVs, and 
minivans on the road.  As a result, frontal crashes between two cars account for a smaller 
fraction of fatalities now than other crash/vehicle combinations.   
 
Figure 7. Percent of driver fatalities in car-car frontal crashes, of all fatalities in two-vehicle 
crashes involving cars and light trucks (Source: FARS)  
 
B. The Crandall/Graham analysis 
 
Crandall and Graham (1989) created a regression model to predict national traffic fatalities based 
on predicted average vehicle weight, using annual national data from 1947 to 1981.  They found 
that the increase in average weight over time coincided with a decrease in fatalities, and 
concluded that CAFÉ fuel economy standards enacted in 1978 lowered average vehicle weight, 
and resulted in a 14% to 28% increase in fatalities.  However, the analysis included only the first 
four years that CAFÉ standards were in effect; since that time average fuel economy of new 
vehicles has changed little, but average weight has increased.  Khazoom (1994) provided a 
critique of Crandall and Graham, and developed an alternative model using state-level data on 
single-vehicle car crashes between 1985 and 1989.  He found that increased car weight increased 
the number of fatalities, at least in single-vehicle car crashes.   
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Although they do not directly assess the relationship between vehicle weight and safety, two 
recent analyses refute Crandall and Graham’s contention that CAFÉ standards increased 
fatalities.  Noland (2004) used state level data from 1975 to 1998, and found a statistical increase 
in fatalities with increasing fuel economy of new vehicles only if years 1975 to 1977 were 
included in the model; if those years were excluded there was no statistically significant 
relationship between fuel economy and fatalities.  And Ahmad and Greene (2004) updated the 
Crandall and Graham analysis using national data from 1966 to 2002, finding that an increase in 
average new vehicle fuel economy resulted in a statistically significant decrease in traffic 
fatalities.  However, neither of these two studies controlled for vehicle weight or size, both of 
which have been increasing since 1981 as the number of fatalities per vehicle have been 
decreasing. 
 
C. The Kahane analyses 
 
The next influential analyses on vehicle mass and safety were conducted by the NHTSA 
statistician, Charles Kahane, in two separate studies (Kahane 1997, Kahane 2003, Kahane 2004).  
Kahane combined fatality data in FARS with vehicle exposure data from police-reported crash 
databases to construct regression models that predict the change in driver fatalities in different 
crash types from reductions in the average mass of vehicles.  The Kahane analysis was an 
improvement over Evans in that it accounted for crash avoidance as well as crash-worthiness, 
and examined the effects of weight reductions on fatalities in all types of crashes.  Kahane went 
to great lengths to account for driver characteristics, to the extent they were available, in his 
regression models.  Table 3 summarizes the results of his most recent analysis. 
 
Table 3. Predicted change in 1999 fatalities with a 100-lb reduction in weight of subject vehicle 
type, Kahane (2003)   
Vehicle 
type/weight 
reduction 
scenario 
Actual 
fatalities in 
1999 crashes 
Effect of 100-lb weight 
reduction (holding 
weight of other vehicles 
constant) 
Predicted net 
change in 1999 
fatalities 
Uncertainty 
range of 
prediction* 
Cars <2,950 lbs 13,608 +4.39% +597 +226 to +715 
Cars >2,950 lbs 10,884 +1.98% +216 +129 to +303 
LDTs <3,870 lbs 8,057 +2.90% +234 +59 to +296 
LDTs >3,870 lbs 14,705 +0.48% +71 -156 to +241 
* 95% confidence interval 
 
Table 3 indicates that a 100-lb reduction in the average vehicle weight of a particular group, 
while holding constant the weights of the other three groups, would result in a net increase in 
overall fatalities.  For example, a 100-lb reduction in the average weight of the lightest cars 
(under 2,950 lbs), holding the weights of all other vehicles constant, would result in a net 597 
increase in fatalities.  This finding holds true for all crash types, for cars and the lightest light 
trucks.  While the increase in risk associated with reduction of the weight of the heaviest trucks 
is not statistically solid, Kahane’s results consistently show that weight reduction increases risk. 
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However, reducing the weight of the heaviest (greater than 3,870 lbs) light trucks is predicted to 
reduce fatalities in certain types of crashes, as shown in Table 4.  A 100-lb reduction in the 
average weight of the heaviest light trucks would reduce fatalities in crashes between the 
heaviest light trucks and cars, and crashes between the heaviest light trucks and other light 
trucks.  However, under this scenario fatalities would increase in rollovers and one-vehicle 
crashes involving the heaviest light trucks, as well as crashes between the these light trucks and 
pedestrians and heavy trucks.  The net result from weight reduction in the heaviest light trucks is 
a small, but not statistically significant, increase (71) in overall fatalities.  The importance of 
Table 4 is that the effect of the 100-lb mass reduction varies widely with crash type, increasing 
fatalities in some types of crashes and reducing them in others.  Let us pursue this issue further. 
 
Table 4. Predicted change in 1999 fatalities with a 100-lb reduction in weight of heaviest light 
trucks (greater than 3,870 lbs) by crash type, Kahane (2003) 
Crash type 
Actual 
fatalities in 
1999 crashes 
Effect of 100-lb 
weight reduction 
(holding weight of 
other vehicles 
constant) 
Predicted net 
change in 
1999 fatalities 
Principal rollover 2,183 +2.56% +56 
Hit object 2,639 +3.06% +81 
Hit pedestrian/bicycle/motorcycle 2,043 +0.13% +3 
Hit heavy truck (>10,000 GVWR) 860 +0.62% +5 
Hit passenger car 5,186 -0.68% -35 
Hit another light truck (<3,870 lbs) 1,010 -1.50% -15 
Hit another light truck (>3,870 lbs) 784 -3.00% -24 
Overall 14,705 +0.48% +71 
 
The critically important limitation of the Kahane analyses is that he used weight as the sole 
vehicle characteristic in his regression models.  His motivation may have been: the historical 
importance given to weight in other vehicle safety analyses (aka Evans); the purported historical 
correlation between weight and size; and the relative ease of obtaining information on weight 
(particularly for cars).1 In principle, Kahane could have considered other safety-related variables 
in addition to mass in his regression analyses, but he chose not to; if he had, his results would 
have been different. 
 
He acknowledged elsewhere in his report that in certain types of crashes weight is not the most 
important vehicle characteristic. Thus, he acknowledged that the static stability factor, or 
generally speaking the vehicle’s center of gravity, plays a large role in the propensity of a vehicle 
to rollover and cause serious injury or death to its occupants in non-collision events.  And he 
found that the fatality rate of cars struck by light trucks increased as the height and stiffness of 
the truck front increased, independent of the weight of the striking vehicle.  The height and 
stiffness of light trucks increased the fatality rates of car drivers struck in the left side by 77% for 
striking pickups, 135% for striking SUVs, and 30% for striking minivans, compared with if the 
                                                
1 Weight is more readily available than other vehicle characteristics, such as center of gravity, bumper height, door 
sill height, and frontal stiffness. Even so, weight is not readily available for light trucks, and can vary by how many 
occupants or how much cargo are in the vehicle. 
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striking vehicle were a car of the same weight (Table 5 below).  Kahane found that SUVs are 
more aggressive than pickups (Table 5), and four wheel drive trucks more aggressive than two 
wheel drive trucks (Table 6), independent of the weight of the striking vehicle. Thus Kahane 
found that fatality rates are strongly influenced not only by crash type but by vehicle type as 
well, independent of vehicle mass. 
  
Table 5: Relative driver fatality rate in struck car, by striking vehicle type (Source: Kahane 2003, 
Table 5, page xix) 
Striking vehicle type 
Crash configuration Car Pickup SUV Minivan 
Car struck in left side 100 177* 235* 130* 
Car struck in front 100 114 132* 104 
* Significantly greater than 100, at the 5% level 
 
Table 6. Relative driver fatality rate in struck car, by striking vehicle type (Source: Kahane 2003, 
Table 6-4, page 262) 
Striking vehicle type 
Crash configuration Car 2WD Pickup 4WD Pickup 2WD SUV 4WD SUV 
Car struck in left side 100 164* 226* 198* 272* 
Car struck in front 100 104 145* 109 152* 
* Significantly greater than 100, at the 5% level 
 
Kahane argued that because vehicle height, stiffness, and center of gravity tend to be somewhat 
correlated with weight (i.e. light trucks tend to be heavier, higher and stiffer than cars), weight 
could be used as a proxy for these other vehicle attributes when conducting his regression 
analyses.  
 
In his latest study, Kahane also acknowledged that any past correlation between vehicle weight 
and height or size would not necessarily hold in future vehicles, particularly if new materials 
were used that would reduce vehicle weight while maintaining vehicle size. But although he 
acknowledges these problems his regression analyses, his important results, do not reflect these 
reservations.  
 
D. The Van Auken and Zellner analyses 
 
In response to the Kahane studies, researchers at the Dynamic Research Institute (DRI) 
conducted several studies to test the assumption that vehicle weight could be used as a proxy for 
other vehicle attributes (vehicle size or height) (Van Auken and Zellner, 2002; Van Auken et al., 
2003; Van Auken and Zellner, 2005a; Van Auken and Zellner, 2005b).  DRI replicated both of 
Kahane’s studies, using similar data and techniques, but included two size variables in addition 
to weight in their regression analyses.  The size variables were trackwidth (the width of the 
vehicle between the two tires) and wheelbase (the length of the vehicle between the two axles).  
These size variables do not accurately capture the protective nature of size, but were thought to 
be better indicators of crush distance than weight.  Table 7 summarizes the results of the latest 
DRI study.  DRI found that, holding trackwidth and wheelbase constant, a 100-lb reduction in 
average car weight would result in a net decrease in the number of fatalities.  On the other hand, 
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reducing trackwidth or wheelbase would increase fatalities.  Combining weight and size 
reductions would result in a small, but not statistically significant, increase in fatalities.  
  
Table 7. Estimated effect of weight and size reductions on 1999 fatalities, for cars and light 
trucks (Source: Van Auken and Zellner, 2005b, Tables 2 and 3, page 27, and Tables 5 and 6, 
page 36) 
Estmated net change in 1999 US fatalities 
involving 
Vehicle parameter change Cars Trucks Total 
100-lb reduction in curb weight  -836* -682* -1,518* 
Corresponding reduction in wheelbase1 1032* 43 1,075* 
Corresponding reduction in trackwidth2 416* 514* 930* 
Combined weight and size reductions 612* -125 487 
11.01 inches for cars, 1.21 inches for trucks 
20.34 inches for cars, 0.57 inches for trucks 
* signficant at the 5% level 
 
In addition to separating the effects of reductions in weight and size, DRI estimated the separate 
effect of weight and size reductions on crashworthiness/compatibility and crash avoidance.  
Table 8 shows that, for cars, the weight and size reductions have about an equal effect on 
crashworthiness/compatibility and crash avoidance.  On the other hand, weight and size 
reductions have a much greater effect on the crash avoidance of trucks than on their 
crashworthiness/compatibility. 
 
Table 8. Estimated effect of weight and size reductions on 1999 fatalities, for cars and light 
trucks, by source of effect (Source: Van Auken and Zellner, 2005b, Tables 2 and 3, page 27, and 
Tables 5 and 6, page 36) 
Estmated net change in 1999 US fatalities involving 
Cars Trucks 
Vehicle parameter change 
Crash- 
worthiness 
Crash 
avoidance 
Crash- 
worthiness 
Crash 
avoidance 
100-lb reduction in curb weight  -472* -364* -155 -528* 
Corresponding reduction in wheelbase1 514* 517* 41 2 
Corresponding reduction in trackwidth2 165* 252* 88 426* 
Combined weight and size reductions 208 404* -25 -100 
11.01 inches for cars, 1.21 inches for trucks 
20.34 inches for cars, 0.57 inches for trucks 
* signficant at the 5% level 
 
The following comes from Kahane’s response to the DRI analysis, submitted to the NHTSA 
docket (Kahane 2005): 
The [NHTSA] study only shows the historical relationship between mass—taking into 
account all the other size attributes that have typically varied with mass—and fatality 
risk, for vehicles of the same type.  If historical relationships between mass and other 
size attributes continue, in the absence of compelling reasons that would change those 
relationships [such as a dramatic change in CAFÉ standards], future changes in mass 
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are likely to be associated with similar changes in fatality risk.  (However, the 
increased use of advanced restraint systems and sophisticated crash avoidance safety 
devices [and lightweight but strong composite materials] in recent and future 
production vehicles could have a noticeable impact on the historical relationship 
between vehicle mass and fatality risk in future vehicle fleets.) 
 
In that sense, it is irrelevant whether mass, wheelbase, trackwidth or some other 
attribute is the principal causal factor on fatality risk.  If you decrease mass, you will 
also tend to get less wheelbase, trackwidth and other size attributes.  It is only 
relevant if you can demonstrate that one (or more) of these size attributes other than 
[or including] mass is the “magic bullet” that explains all the change in fatality risk.  
In that case, you would have a compelling reason to hold that size attribute constant 
(or even increase it) while decreasing mass, and the historical relationship between 
mass and safety would no longer apply. [text added by authors] 
 
The above reiterates two important conclusions of the regression analyses by Kahane and Van 
Auken and Zellner: that size may be as important, if not more important, than mass in protecting 
drivers in many types of crashes; and that the analysis of size and mass using historical data is 
made difficult by their tendency to be correlated, at least in vehicles of current design.  All of 
these statistical studies using actual on-road data are based on the historical relationship between 
vehicle mass, size, and other vehicle characteristics, and their effect on safety.  In effect, they 
argue that if one takes 100 lbs. out of the average compact car it will become an average 
subcompact car, not only with respect to all the other physical attributes of a subcompact car 
(safety features, or lack thereof, number of seats, engine size, wheelbase, etc.) but also with 
respect to the unobserved attributes of the subcompact car drivers’ behavior and its environment.  
None of these studies account for, say, extensive use of lightweight materials, which would 
decouple the historical correlation between vehicle mass and other characteristics.  Evans 
recently acknowledged this in his most recent article:  “Increasing the amount of light-weight 
materials in a vehicle can lead to lighter, larger vehicles possessing all of the following 
concurrent characteristics: reduced risk to its occupants in two-vehicle crashes; reduced risk to 
occupants in other vehicles into which it crashes; [and] reduced risk to its occupants in single 
vehicle crashes. (Evans, 2004)” 
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V. On-road risks by vehicle type and model 
 
A. The Wenzel and Ross analyses 
 
Building on results by others (Hollowell and Gabler, 1996; Gabler and Hollowell, 1998; Joksch, 
1998; Joksch et al., 1998;  IIHS, 2000), Wenzel and Ross analyzed driver risk by vehicle type 
and model.  “Risk” is the number of driver deaths per year of the selected vehicle, divided by the 
millions of these vehicles on the road.  Typically, the model years of the vehicle being 
considered and the type of crash may be specified.  Because these risks are calculated using data 
on actual crash fatalities, they account for both the crash avoidance and crashworthiness of 
vehicle types and models, and include the effects of how differences in vehicle design, driver 
behavior, and driving environment affect safety.  As such, our use of the word “risk” can be 
taken to mean “risk as driven.” 
 
Risk is calculated not only for the drivers of particular vehicles (referred to as “risk-to-drivers”), 
but also the risk they impose on drivers of other vehicles (referred to as “risk-to-drivers-of-other-
vehicles”, or “risk-to-others”).  Usually analysts only present and discuss the risk to occupants of 
the vehicle in question, as if we as individuals or the society at large don’t care about the 
mayhem caused by aggressive vehicles. The regression analyses in the Kahane and DRI analyses 
essentially involve the same fatality risks at the model year/make/model level as explicitly 
reported in Wenzel and Ross. 
 
Figures 8 and 9 show the two types of risk, by vehicle type, in two different formats.  Figure 8 
plots each type of risk on its own axis.  Both risks for minivans are 40 fatalities per million 
registered-vehicle-years; however, for 1-ton pickups, the risk to their own drivers is 100 fatalities 
per million registered-vehicle-years, while the risk they impose on drivers of other vehicles is 
200 fatalities per million registered vehicle-years.  Figure 10 stacks the risks-to-others on top of 
the risks-to-drivers.  The figures show that pickup risk-to-others increases substantially with 
increasing mass and size, with the risk-to-others of the largest pickups an order of magnitude 
greater than that of the most popular car model.  Note that SUVs (71) and, to a lesser extent, 
pickups (100 to 123, depending on size) have risk-to-drivers comparable to those of large cars 
(75); Figure 10 indicates that the additional risk to SUV drivers in rollover crashes (34, 
compared to 14 in large cars) overcomes their reduced risk in crashes with another vehicle (37, 
compared to 61 in large cars).  Because of the relatively small numbers of fatalities in each 
vehicle type, differences in risk of less than 10% between vehicle types are not statistically 
significant.   
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Figure 8. Risk-to-drivers, and risk-to-drivers-of-other-vehicles, by vehicle type; differences 
between vehicle types less than 10% are not statistically significant 
 
Figure 9. Risk-to-drivers, and risk-to-drivers-of-other-vehicles, by vehicle type; differences 
between vehicle types less than 10% are not statistically significant 
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Figure 10. Risk-to-drivers in rollover crashes and all other crashes, by vehicle type; differences 
between vehicle types less than 10% are not statistically significant 
 
 
Figure 11 plots risk against risk-to-others in a scatterplot similar to Figure 8, but shows the risks 
for the most popular vehicle models.  Because of the relatively small numbers of fatalities in 
each model, differences in risk of less than 20% between models are not statistically significant.  
The analysis of risks by vehicle make/model allows the study of whether who drives these 
vehicles, as well as how and where they are driven, affects their risks.  Note that there can be a 
wide range in risk, even for models in the same class.  For instance, five subcompact models 
(Neon, Cavalier, Sunfire, Escort, and Accent) have much higher risk-to-drivers than all other 
subcompact models; we put these subcompact cars into a separate “high-risk subcompacts” 
category in Figures 8 through 10.  Similarly, there is a wide range in both types of risk for SUV 
models, with the crossover models RX300 and CR-V having much lower risks than some truck-
based SUV models.  (Because they have such high risk-to-drivers-of-other-vehicles, ¾-ton and 
1-ton pickup models are not shown in Figure 11.) 
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Figure 11. Risk-to-drivers in rollover crashes and all other crashes, by vehicle type; differences 
between models less than 20% are not statistically significant 
 
 
Two aspects of historical SUV design account for their high rollover risk and risk-to-others.  
SUVs which were based on pickup truck chassis tend to have high centers of gravity, and very 
stiff, and high, longitudinal frame rails (Figure 12) that often override car bumpers and door sills, 
and intrude into the passenger compartment of the car.  The newer crossover SUV designs, 
which tend to have lower centers of gravity than truck-based SUVs and unibody construction 
similar to cars, tend to have lower risk both to their own drivers and to drivers of other vehicles, 
as shown by the open symbols in Figure 13.  These newer crossover SUV designs not only have 
better safety records than truck-based SUVs; they provide roughly 3 to 4 miles per gallon higher 
fuel economy for a given interior volume (Figure 14). 
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Figure 12. Stiff frame rails of pickups and truck-based SUVs (model year 2002 Dodge Ram 150 
pickup truck) 
 
Figure 13. SUV risk-to-drivers and risk-to-drivers-of-other-vehicles, by SUV type and model 
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Figure 14. Fuel economy and interior volume of 2005 truck-based and crossover SUV models 
(4WD versions) 
 
B. The effect of drivers and environment on risk  
 
Recall that, because these risks are calculated using data on actual crash fatalities, they include 
the effects of how differences in vehicle design, driver behavior, and driving environment affect 
safety by vehicle type and model.  We try to account for these driver and environment 
characteristics.  For instance, using California registration data, we analyzed risk in urban and 
rural counties of the state; Figure 15 indicates that each type of risk is greater in rural areas than 
urban areas, for all vehicle types.  Therefore, because pickups tend to be driven more in rural 
areas, our estimate of pickup risk both to own drivers and other drivers is overstated due to 
greater use in rural areas, where fatality risks are greater. 
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Figure 15. Risk to drivers and to others, by vehicle type and area, California 1995-02 
 
Similarly, large differences in driver characteristics can make inflate the risks of particular 
vehicle types or models.  We used a measure of illegal driving developed by Kahane to compare 
driver characteristics across vehicle types and models.  This “bad driver rating” is based on 
alcohol or drug involvement, driving without a valid license or reckless driving in the current 
crash, as well as the driver’s driving record in the last three years.  Figure 16 compares the bad 
driver rating by vehicle type with risk-to-drivers and population density.  The population density 
where the fatality occurred is expressed by the relative diameter of the bubble for each vehicle 
type; smaller bubbles had a larger percentage of fatal crashes in rural areas.  The figure suggests 
that risk to drivers increases with increasing bad driver rating and decreasing population density.  
However, there are important exceptions to these trends.  Import luxury cars, which have the 
lowest risk to driver, have some of the worst drivers, on average.  On the other hand, sports cars 
have extremely high risks, yet are mostly driven in relatively safe urban environments.  And the 
high-risk subcompact cars have nearly twice the risk of the low-risk subcompact cars, but about 
the same bad driver rating and degree of rural driving. 
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Figure 16. Effect of bad driver rating and population density on risk-to-drivers, by vehicle type 
 
The Wenzel and Ross analysis by vehicle make and model points out a limitation in Kahane’s 
analysis.  In simple terms, Kahane’s approach essentially models what would happen if the 
historical risk of model year 1991-99 cars were replaced with the historical risk of 1991-99 
models that were 100 pounds lighter.  In other words, he argues that if one takes 100 lbs. out of a 
compact car it will become a subcompact car, not only with respect to all the other physical 
attributes of a subcompact car (safety features, or lack thereof, number of seats, engine size, 
wheelbase, etc.) but also with respect to the unobserved attributes of the subcompact car drivers’ 
behavior and its environment.  However, as Figure 17 indicates, there can be a large range in 
risk-to-drivers, even for car models with similar mass.  The figure indicates that there is not a 
strong relationship between the overall fatality risk and the weight of individual car models.  The 
risks in Figure 17 do not account for differences in where or how car models may be driven; 
however, our analyses indicate that these differences are not large enough or consistent enough 
to explain the large variation in risk for models of the same weight.  Some factors other than 
weight appear to better predict the fatality risk of a car model; for instance, car models with 
Ford, GM, or Daimler-Chrysler nameplates consistently have higher risk than models with 
Japanese or German nameplates; and resale value after five years is much more strongly 
correlated with fatality risk (Wenzel and Ross, 2005). 
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Figure 17. Risk-to-drivers and vehicle weight, for individual car models 
 
 
Another limitation of all these statistical analyses (Kahane, Van Auken/Zellner, Wenzel/Ross) is 
that they do not, and cannot, account for all differences in driver characteristics and behavior, 
and environmental conditions, that likely greatly influence whether a vehicle is involved in a 
fatal crash.  Kahane and Van Auken/Zellner made great attempts to account for the most obvious 
of these variables: driver age and gender, alcohol and drug involvement, and driving record.  
However, other important variables, such as income and education, are not available in the 
FARS or NASS data (although may be available in insurance claim data).  Other more subtle 
differences between drivers, such as driving skill and experience, also are not available, and are 
difficult to measure. 
 
C. Steps to improve the compatibility of cars and light trucks 
 
Light truck manufacturers recently agreed to adopt voluntary measures to address the 
aggressivity of light trucks.  These measures consist of, 1) for frontal compatibility, lowering the 
bumpers or lowering the chassis of light trucks and 2) for side impact compatibility, installing 
curtain side airbags in cars.  A recent IIHS study suggests that SUV models which comply with 
these measures have substantially reduced risk-to-others compared with non-complying models; 
but complying pickups do not show improved compatibility.  LBNL analysis suggests that 
crossover SUVs, which generally comply with the compatibility measures, have substantially 
reduced risk, while truck-based SUVs have not, whether or not they comply with the 
compatibility measures.  However, the LBNL analysis suggests that all pickups, of all sizes 
(compact to 1-ton), and not just complying models, have reduced risk-to-others.  It appears that 
there are not yet sufficient data to assess whether the compliant truck-based SUVs and pickups 
are less aggressive than their non-compliant counterparts. 
  28 
VI. New research on injury causation 
 
Detailed research on injury causation by medical doctors teaming with engineers opens a new 
way to address the mass/safety issue.  And, incidentally, it provides an independent approach to 
the issue of mass reduction and safety. There are three main proximate causes of injury to 
occupants in a crash, 1) “contact”, either striking intruding surfaces or striking hard surfaces in 
an undeformed passenger compartment, 2) “restrained acceleration”, in which occupant 
experiences injurious deceleration by the safety constraints (seat belts, airbags, head rests), and 
3) a sequence of such events, especially including occupant ejection, as may particularly occur in 
rollovers.  
 
Contact injuries dominate for belted occupants in the most modern vehicles (see, for example, 
Figures 3 and 4 in Ross et al., 2006).  Contact injuries tend to be localized in the vehicle and to 
occur rapidly. They are not sensitive to the the mass of the vehicle as a whole.  Critical vehicle 
characteristics for safety in “contact” situations are vehicle stability, use and quality of the 
restraints, energy absorbing space outside the occupant compartment, and a strong occupant 
compartment itself.  
 
The “restrained acceleration” and “sequential” injuries tend to involve most of the vehicle and 
evolve over a longer period. Some analysts, especially Evans, have argued that vehicle mass 
must be important to injury because the overall deceleration of the lighter vehicle and its 
occupants during a two-vehicle crash is proportional to the ratio of the heavier to the lighter 
masses.  He is right that restrained acceleration can be risky. A stiff vehicle that is relatively light 
may, because it is light, be strongly accelerated as a whole, causing injury. However, as one 
might expect, the evidence is that “restrained acceleration” is much less common as the cause of 
serious injury or death than contact mechanisms.  
 
Recent research in this area involves a few teams of engineers and medical doctors that 
collaborate in “on-the-spot” and “in-depth” analysis of crashes near each team’s site. Some 
teams attempt to reach automotive crashes within 10 to 20 minutes so they can better determine 
vehicle trajectories and interview witnesses.  The research appears to be particularly well 
organized and supported around certain European cities, such as sites within Hanover and 
Dresden.  Supporting the contact perspective, European specialists associated with this research 
say:  “The results from this project have overturned the original views about compatibility,2 
which thought that mass and the mass ratio were the dominant factors (Edwards et al., 2001).”  
“Moreover, if mass appears to be the main parameter linked to aggressivity of cars, it is because 
this is the easiest and universal parameter that is collected in all accident databases (Faerber, 
2001).”  “The scientific community now agrees that mass does not play a direct role in 
compatibility (Delannoy and Faure, 2003).”  The concept of these scientists is that, for the range 
of vehicle masses typical in Europe, mass is not fundamental to compatibility.  Instead they find 
intrusion is the proximate cause of most severe injuries, and intrusion is primarily associated 
with factors like the stiffness and geometry of vehicles, not with mass as such.  
 
                                                
2 Compatibility means features in a vehicle that tend to protect occupants of other vehicles in a multi-vehicle crash. 
  29 
In-depth study of crashes is also underway in the US (the Crash Injury Research and Engineering 
Network, or CIREN, and the National Accident Sampling System Crashworthiness Data System, 
or NASS CDS).  Results, though limited, again suggest the dominance of contact, especially 
intrusion (Augenstein et al., 2005; Ross et al., 2006). These studies suggest that up to 10 or 15% 
of serious injuries may be associated with restrained acceleration.  This preliminary work 
suggests that only a small fraction of serious injuries are sensitive to vehicle mass. 
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VII. Conclusions 
 
Mass reduction is critical if vehicles are to meet greenhouse gas and oil savings goals.  Two 
aspects of vehicle design are involved: Risks can be reduced by improvement of vehicle 
structures.  Mass can be reduced by making several different design changes.  
 
In crashes with a stationary object, frontal crush space, rather than mass, provides protection to 
the vehicle occupants,  Mass offers protection in head-on car-car, and perhaps truck-truck, 
crashes when there is a substantial difference in mass between the two vehicles.  In head-on 
crashes between a car and a truck, differences in frontal height and/or stiffness, rather than mass, 
are the most important factor.  Car occupants that are struck in the side by a light truck are at 
special risk because there is little room for crush space in the side structure of a car.  The 
aggressivity of a striking truck can be mitigated either by lowering the bumper or the stiff parts 
of the truck, or by making the front of the truck less stiff.  More detailed tests are needed to 
determine which characteristic is more important in defining a truck’s aggressivity.  Raising the 
car bumper height (in head-on crashes) or door sill height (in side impact crashes), reinforcing 
the occupant compartment, and installing side curtain airbags, may increase protection to car 
occupants struck by a light truck. 
 
Increased mass improves neither the crash avoidance ability or crashworthiness of a vehicle in a 
rollover crash.  Although SUVs and pickups are more likely to roll over than passenger cars 
which are generally lighter, the height of a vehicle’s center of gravity has a substantially greater 
impact than mass on the propensity of a vehicle to roll over.  The center of gravity can be 
lowered by lowering the overall vehicle height, or by increasing its track width.   
 
In statistical analyses, mass has been shown to have a protective effect in crashes with an object 
and with another vehicle.  However, recent research indicates that mass is merely a proxy for 
other characteristics that are more important for crashes between cars and trucks, such as frontal 
height and stiffness.   
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